make choices between different domestic laws, but determine the scope of application of the CISG's uniform substantial law rules; they are thus not itself conflict of law rules. 4 According to its Art. 1 (1) the CISG "applies to contracts of sale of goods between parties whose places of business are in different States: (a) when the States are Contracting States; or (b) when the rules of private international law [of the forum'] lead to the application of the law of a Contracting State". In Contracting States to the CISG, the forum's PIL rules thus come into play only if the conditions of Art. l(l)(a) of the CISG are not met, i.e. only if one of the parties has its place of business in a non-Contracting State. The court then has to tum to Art.l(l)(b) of the CISG and analyse whether its PIL rules designate the law of a CISG Contracting State, in which case the CISG applies. When applied according to Art. l(l)(b) of the CISG, the forum's PIL rules do not fulfil their traditional role to make a choice between different national laws but are applied as part of the rules determining whether the case falls within the scope of application of the CISG.
Only if the conditions of neither Art. 1 (1) lit. (a) nor of lit. (b) of the CISG are fulfilled and, consequently, the CISG is not applicable, or if the question under examination is not covered by the CISG (Art. 7(2) in fine of the CISG), recourse to the PIL rules of the forum is made in order to coordinate, and make a choice between, different domestic non-unified systems oflaw. 4 On the much debated question of whether Art.1(1) of the CISG is a conflict of law Presentation of the Problem
In non-Contracting States to the CISG, judges are not treaty-bound to apply the CISG. They will, as an initial step, consequently ignore the CISG and tum to their conflict of law rules instead. Courts in the UK, Ireland, Portugal, and Malta, for example, will determine the law applicable to an international sales contract according to the rules set forth in the Rome I Regulation.
If, e.g., an English merchant orders cars from a German manufacturer or watch mechanisms from a Swiss manufacturer, courts in the UK will determine the applicable law according to Art. 3 or Art. 4(l)(a) of the Rome I Regulation. If the parties have not chosen the applicable law, the courts will apply Art. 4(1 )(a) of the Rome I Regulation, which provides that "a contract for the sale of goods shall be governed by the law of the country where the seller has his habitual residence" or, in the case of companies, its "central administration" (Art. 19) . Given that the sellers in the scenario have their central administrations in Germany and Switzerland respectively, the contracts in the scenarios would be governed by German or Swiss law respectively.
Will English courts then be required to apply the sales law of the Gennan Civil code( § § 433 et seq. of the Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch, BGB) or the provisions on sales of the Swiss Code of obligations (Art. 184 et seq. of the Code des ob!igations/Obligationenrecht, CO) respectively, or will they have to apply the CISG given that the CISG is in force in Germany and Switzerland?
The leading treatises and commentaries on the conflict of laws and on international sales contracts still leave the question open whether courts in nonContracting States to the CISG are required to apply the CISG where the PIL of the forum refers to the law of a Contracting State. According to DICEY, MORRIS, and COLLINS, " [t] here is one possible circumstance in which an English court might be required to apply the [CISG] despite the fact that the United Kingdom has not ratified the Convention. This is where the law applicable to the contract of sale under the Rome Convention [now the Rome I Regulation] is found to be the law of a country which is a party to the United Nations Convention and that country would regard the Convention as applicable."
6 Michael BRIDGE states that, "[e]ven before the courts of their own country, UK merchants may find the CISG applied to one of their contracts if it contains a choice of law clause in favour of the law of a Contracting State or if that law proves to be the applicable law for other reasons. The CISG might be applied here as part of the applicable law".' Loukas MISTELLIS states that in such cases "the Convention . . . should be considered by the courts".
8 According to Christophe BERNASCONI, "if the Private international law of the forum points to the law of a Contracting State, it is suitable to apply the CISG".
9 Last but not least, according to Peter SCHLECHTRIEM'S and Ingeborg SCHWENZER'S Commentary on the UN Convention on the International Sale of Goods; "courts in non-Contracting States may have to apply the Convention as foreign law, if their conflict of law rules refer to the law of a Contracting State".1°
The scenarios that these authors refer to are identical to the one in the above case study: courts in England, Ireland, Portugal, Malta, or any other nonContracting State to the CISG apply their domestic PIL rules and these rules designate the law of a Contracting State that would consider the CISG as applicable to the contract of sale under examination. English, Irish, Portuguese, or Maltese courts as well as courts in other non-Contracting States might thus be required, according to the authors cited, to apply the CISG despite the fact that these States have not ratified the Convention.
It is striking that all these authors are very careful in their wording as to the application of the CISG by courts in non-Contracting States: Courts in nonContracting States "may" or "might" apply the CISG in these situations, the CISG "should be considered" and it is possibly "suitable to apply" the CISG. Given that as yet there is, astonishingly, no published case law on this point by courts in nonContracting States to the CISG, it is, for the moment, indeed far from certain that they actually will apply the CISG. 12 If this is so, and if even Contracting States to the CISG may declare that they wish to apply the CISG only as between Contracting States, should the application of the CISG then -a fortiori -not be excluded altogether in a State that has not even ratified the CISG at all?
However, this argument compares two situations that are fundamentally different:
(1) the situation in which the forum's PIL rules designate the law of a Contracting State that has opted out of Art. 1 (l)(b) of the CISG and has hereby declared to apply the CISG only as between Contracting States (example of a seller in New York and a buyer in the UK; before the courts in NY the CISG is not applicable); and (2) the situation in which the PIL in a non-Contracting State designates the law of a Contracting State to the CISG that has not opted out of Art. 1 (l) (b) and that thus applies the CISG also to cases in which only one party has its place of business in a Contracting State (example of a Swiss seller and an English buyer; before English courts, the Rome I Regulation designates Swiss law, i.e. the law of a State that applies the CISG also with regard to non-Contracting States). In the first situation, the law of a State having declared not to be bound by Art. 1 (1 )(b) of the CISG applies; in the second scenario, the law of a State that has not opted out of Art. 1 (1 )(b) of the CISG is applicable.
A court in a non-Contracting State to the CISG must apply the applicable foreign law as it finds it. It is thus for the foreign law that is applicable to the sales contract to detennine whether the CISG on the one hand or, on the other hand, the domestic non-unified sales law of this country applies (e.g. because the foreign State has declared to apply the CISG only if both parties have their places of business in Contracting States). That is why the a fortiori argument based on Art. 95 of the CISG is, eventually, not convincing. Art. 95 thus does not exclude the application of the CISG in non-Contracting States. It has, however, other important implications; we will come back to them in a moment. 
Art. 25 of the Rome I Regulation (Relationship with Existing International Conventions)
In the EU, another possible argument refers to Art. 25 of the Rome I Regulation.
14 Art. 25 provides that "[t]his Regulation shall not prejudice the application of international conventions to which one or more Member States are parties at the time when this Regulation is adopted and which lay down conflict-of-law rules relating to contractual obligations". According to Dicey, Morris, and Collins' treatise on English conflict oflaws it is "possible to construe The first line of reasoning focuses on the purpose of Art. 20 of the Rome I Regulation. Art. 20 excludes the application of foreign private international rules when the Rome I Regulation designates the law of a foreign country. It hereby makes sure that the connecting factors used in Rome I prevail and ensures that they do not have to give way to, and be thwarted by, diverging connecting factors of a foreign legal system that would refer back to the forum's law (or that would designate the law of a third country), hereby contradicting the connecting factors used in the Rome I Regulation. Art. 20 thus excludes the application of foreign PIL rules in order to exclude renvoi.
However, when recourse to foreign PIL rules is made in order to determine whether a foreign jurisdiction would regard the CISG as applicable, it is by definition excluded that the foreign PIL rules refer back to the law of the forum (renvoi premier degre or Riickverweisung) or to the law of a third country (renvoi deuxieme degre or Weiterverweisung). Let us assume that the PIL of a non-Contracting State (e.g. English PIL) designates the law of country X, a Contracting State to the CISG. The English court would then need to analyse whether the CISG, as part of the sales law of country X, or, on the contrary, this country's domestic non-unified sales law applies. In order to draw the line between the scopes of application of the different systems of sales law, the court in the non-Contracting State (in our example: the English court) would then need to analyse whether, according to the law of country X, the conditions for the application of the CISG (as opposed to this country's domestic non-unified sales law) are fulfilled. The court might then possibly be required to analyse Art. 1 (1 )(b) and the PIL rules of country X. 20 This could, however, never lead to a renvoi: if the PIL of country X designates the law of a Contracting State to the CISG (be it the law of X or of any other Contracting State), the conditions for the application of the CISG are -under the law of country X -fulfilled and the CISG applies; if, on the contrary, the PIL of State X designates the law of a foreign non-Contracting State, the CISG does not apply and the domestic sales law of country X applies instead.
According to this first line of reasoning, the PIL of country X is thus not applied in order to choose between the laws of different jurisdictions (potentially leading to renvoi and hereby violating Art. 20 of Rome I) but exclusively in order to determine which rules of country X apply (the CISG or this country's domestic, non-unified sales law). They are thus not applied in their function of PIL rules, making a choice between different jurisdictions and potentially leading to the application of a foreign law, but, on the contrary, as part on the rules of the scope of application of the CISG. The choice between the laws of different States (in our example: the choice of the law of country X, as opposed to the law of any other country) is exclusively made by the PIL of the forum (i.e. the PIL rules of the non-Contracting State, in our example: English PIL). If this is so, there is no room for renvoi and for a violation of Art. 20 of the Rome I Regulation.
A closer look shows moreover that, in cases in which the PIL of a nonContracting State designates the law of a Contracting State, the court in the nonContracting State arguably does not have to apply lit. (b) of Art. 1 (1) of the CJSG at all when it comes to determining the scope of application of the CISG under the foreign law, as opposed to the foreign country's domestic sales law. This second line of reasoning will be further set out in the following section.
C. Determining the Scope of Application of the CISG under a Foreign Law, Applicable to the Contract
In this chapter it will be argued that, if the PIL of a non-Contracting State designates the law of a Contracting State to the CISG, all the court in the non-Contracting State still needs to determine is whether the case is within the material (or substantive) scope of application of the CISG, i.e. whether the CISG applies ratione materiae. For this purpose, no resort to foreign PIL rules is required at all. In our scenario of the English buyer and the Gennan or Swiss seller, in the absence of a choice of law agreement by the parties (Art. 3 of Rome I) it is Art. 4(l)(a) of Rome I that designates, before English courts, the substantive law of the seller's country of habitual residence, i. e. German or Swiss law respectively. Once the law of a foreign country has been designated, the next question is to determine which set of rules within this state's legal system to apply, and in particular whether the rules of the applicable law are to be found in the CISG or the domestic sales law -in our examples: the German Civil code's provisions on sales contracts or the Swiss Code of obligations provisions on sales contracts.
At this stage of the analysis, the decision on the applicable law has already been made by the PIL rules of the forum state. Within the legal system of the Contracting State of the CISG, designated by the PIL rules of the forum state, the scope of application of the CJSG, as opposed to the scope of application of this state's domestic sales law, is defined in Art. 1 ( 1) (first half of the sentence )2 1 and in Art. 2 et seq. of the CISG: The CISG applies ratione materiae "to contracts of sale of goods between parties whose places of business are in different States'', Art. 1(1) (first half of the sentence ) 22 unless the application of the CISG is excluded for the reasons listed in Art. 2 lit. a) to f), Art. 3(2), 5, or 6 of the CISG.
Since the PIL of the forum (in our example: the Rome I Regulation before English courts) have already designated the law of a Contracting State as the applicable law (in our examples: the law of the German or Swiss seller), no further analysis is necessary; in particular, no recourse is to be made to lit. a) or lit. b) of Art. 1 (I) ClSG. At this stage of the analysis, Art. 1(1) (first half of the sentence) of the CISG (as part of the foreign law, designated by Rome I) is thus applied exclusively in order to examine whether the case falls within the material (or substantive) scope of application of the CISG. . 24 This interpretation is fully in line with the unanimous understanding (references supra, note 5) that a case falls within the scope of application of the CISG once the PIL rules of the forum designate the law of a Contracting State.
I Regulation consequently does not prevent these courts from applying the CISG.' 5 Quite the opposite: they have to apply the CISG as part of the domestic sales law of the foreign jurisdiction, provided that the case falls within the material scope of application of the CISG -and provided the CISG has been fully integrated into the applicable law of this jurisdiction. 
1.

Contracting States Having Fully Integrated the CISG
The above reasoning is based on the idea that from its entry into force in a Contracting State, the CISG becomes an integrated part of the domestic sales law of this State.
Within the legal system of the Contracting State, the CISG exists on an equal level with all other laws in force in this jurisdiction, such as, e.g., the domestic rules on sales contracts, commercial contracts or consumer contracts. In other words: "the Convention is [ ... ] local, specialized law that applies in the same way as are applied any separate laws for commercial and consumer contracts ofsale". 27 If the PIL rules of the forum designate the law of a Contracting State to the CISG, the court simply does not have the power to "cherry-pick" certain rules of the foreign law designated by its conflict oflaw rules while leaving aside others.
Within the legal system of the Contracting State designated by the PIL of the forum, the substantive sales law of the CISG provides specific rules that are made for, and adapted to, the needs that arise in cross-border cases. While the French Code civil, the German BGB, the Swiss Obligationenrecht, the Spanish C6digo civil, the Italian Cadice civile, the Polish Kodeks cywilny, etc. are made primarily for domestic situations, the CISG contains a set of rules that are specifically set up for the needs of transnational actors. Within the jurisdiction of a Contracting State, the CISG (where applicable) provides specific rules for transnational sales contracts, as opposed to the domestic codes which are made primarily for domestic situations. The principle of !ex specialis derogat legi generali clearly speaks in favour of applying the CISG as part of the law of the designated jurisdiction. 
Contracting States Having Used the Option under Art. 95 of the CISG
The above reasoning requires the CISG to be fully integrated into the domestic sales law of the respective Contracting State. If the PIL of the forum, e.g. the Rome I Regulation before courts in the UK, Ireland, Portugal, or Malta, designates the law of a Contracting State to the CISG, and ifthe case falls ratione materiae into the scope of application of the CISG, the judge in the non-Contracting State has to apply the CISG -just as the CISG would be given preference over the non-unified domestic sales law within the contract law system of the Contracting State. The situation is different if the forum's PIL rules designate a jurisdiction that has used the option in Art. 95 of the CISG and consequently applies the CISG only if both parties to an international contract have their places of business in different Contracting States. This opportunity has been used by China, Singapore, the USA, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and -in Europe -by the Czech Republic and Slovakia. In these jurisdictions, the sales law of the CISG has not become a fully integrated part of the domestic sales law. On the contrary, the application of the CISG is limited to situations in which both parties have their places of business in different Contracting States. In these jurisdictions, the CISG is treated rather like an international Convention requiring reciprocity than as an integral part of the domestic sales law.
29 This has to be taken into consideration by courts in non-Contracting States when its PIL rules designate the law of a State having used the option under Art. 95. Here again courts in non-Contracting States have to take the foreign law, applicable to the contract, as they find it, including these countries' rules on the coordination between an international convention (such as the CISG) on the one hand and the domestic nonunified contract law on the other.
This argument might again be illustrated by a case scenario: China is among the countries having made an Art. 95 reservation. If for example a Chinese company sells goods to an English buyer, and ifbefore an English court Chinese contract law is applicable to the sales contract (e.g. according to Art. 4(1)(a) of the Rome I Regulation), it is arguably not sufficient that the case falls ratione materiae within the scope of application of the CISG for the CISG to apply, as opposed to the Chinese Contract Act of 1999. Here again, the English judge has to take the foreign contract law as he finds it; the CISG and the Chinese Contract Act consequently have to be coordinated according to the law applicable to the contract, i.e. Chinese law. Since, under Chinese law, the CISG applies only if both parties have their places of business in different Contracting States to the CISG, and since, in the above example, one of the parties to the contract has its place of business in a non-Contracting State, under Chinese law the case is not governed by the CISG but by the Chinese Contract Act. Given that the English court has to take Chinese law as it finds it, including its rules on the coordination of the CISG and the Chinese Contract Act, the court will have to apply the Chinese Contract Act as opposed to the CISG (just as a Chinese court would do).
E.
Intermediate Conclusions
1.
In Contracting States to the CISG that have fully integrated the CISG into their domestic sales law, the CISG is, on the substantive law level, !ex specialis for international sales contracts and prevails over the domestic non-unified rules on sales contracts, provided that the case falls within the material scope of application of the CISG. Even though the better arguments plead for the application of the CISG, courts in non-Contracting States (such as the UK, Ireland, Portugal, and Malta) may nevertheless follow the opposite opinion and decide not to apply the CISG. Would it be advisable for courts in non-Contracting States, and in particular courts in Common law countries such as England and Ireland, to apply (or not to apply) the CISG in such scenarios? It may, again, be helpful to illustrate this issue by our case scenario; for this purpose it will be slightly modified. Let us assume that an English car merchant has sent an order for several sports cars to the German manufacturer. Before the German manufacturer sends an acceptance, the English car dealer sends a fax or e-mail declaring that he wishes to revoke his order. In a second scenario an Irish jeweller orders a batch of watch mechanisms from a Swiss manufacturer but cancels his order before the Swiss manufacturer sends its acceptance. Both the German and the Swiss company subsequently send letters of acceptance to their English and Irish counterparts. Was the offer revocable or has a contract been concluded?
Should the parties have chosen Gennan or Swiss law as the law applicable to the contract, the contract would, before English or Irish courts, be governed by the law chosen, Art. 3(1) of the Rome I Regulation. If the parties have not chosen the applicable law, the contract is governed by the law of the seller, i.e. German law in the first scenario, and Swiss law in the second, Art. 4(l)(a) or the Rome I Regulation. According to Art. 10( 1) of the Rome I Regulation, the applicable law governs also the question of whether a contract was concluded.
In the majority of European jurisdictions, the offeror is bound by his offer for a certain amount of time; either for the period set out in the offer or, in the absence of a set period, for a reasonable length of time, Art. This gives the other party time to consider and evaluate the offer.
If a court in the UK or Ireland applies the German BGB or the Swiss Code of obligations, the offer was irrevocable and the contract, in both scenarios, concluded. Not so according to the CISG: Art. 16 (1) of the CISG states, on the contrary, that "[u]ntil a contract is concluded an offer may be revoked if the revocation reaches the offeree before he has dispatched an acceptance". If the judge applies the CISG, the offer was thus revocable and no contract was concluded -just as under the English postal rule' 1 on which Art. 16(1) of the CISG is based. This is but one of many examples in which the solutions in the CISG are more familiar to English or Irish parties, their lawyers and the judges than the solutions they will find in many foreign countries, in particular those on the continent.
Another example concerns the role of fault in the law of contracts. Under German law, even in sales law, contractual liability depends on the fault of the defendant, the fault being presumed, § 280(1) BGB. 32 The same is true, with some modifications, for Swiss law, Art. 208(3) of the Code of obligations, 33 and it is also the case, e.g., in the law of Belgium. 34 This solution might be due to the fact, and is probably (only) understandable when taking into account, that both Germany and Switzerland are major exporting countries and the fault principle is supposed to favour parties having their place of business in these countries. 35 On the contrary under the CISG, just like in English law, the contractual liability of the seller is strict (and thus favours the buyer).
There are many more issues for which the solution under the CISG is more familiar to English parties, lawyers and judges than the solutions of the German BGB, the Swiss CO, the French Code civil, the Spanish C6digo civil, the Italian Cadice civile, the Polish Kodeks cywilny, etc. To cite just one more example: under many domestic laws on the continent, the parties to a contract have a contractual right to receive performance and the rules on civil procedure in these countries provide sophisticated remedies to enforce this right. 36 On the continent, the remedy of specific performance is regarded as an inherent component of contractual rights and the backbone of all contractual obligations. In Common Law, on the contrary, specific performance is regarded as an exceptional remedy. 37 The CISG takes the Common Law approach into account and provides, under Art. 28, that "a court is not bound to enter a judgement for specific performance unless the court would do so under its own law in respect of similar contracts of sale not governed by this Convention." Here, again, the domestic codifications on the continent provide for solutions that, at least in principle, fundamentally differ from English law whereas the CISG takes the English law into consideration and provides the English judge with a way to avoid ordering specific performance where he would not do so if English law were applicable.
The above scenarios show that the rules and solutions under the CISG are often much more familiar to parties, lawyers and judges in Common law countries than those in force under foreign domestic non-unified laws. Furthermore, the English translations of many foreign legal texts are unfortunately still poor and not sufficiently precise. Many legal materials, such as commentaries to foreign codes, have not yet been translated into English at all. The CISG and the case law to it have, on the contrary, the advantage of being easily accessible to lawyers and judges worldwide.
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III. Conclusions
1.
In Contracting States to the CISG, the first question a court has to ask is whether the case falls within the scope of application of the CISG's uniform substantive law rules. Where there are uniform substantive law rules that apply, there is no conflict of laws.
2.
It is submitted that courts in non-Contracting States to the CISG (in the EU: English, Irish, Portuguese and Maltese courts) have to apply the foreign law as they find it. They are thus required to apply the CISG, as opposed to of a foreign non-unified sales law, in cases where their PIL designates the law of a Contracting State to the CISG, provided that the case falls within the CISG's material scope of application. Once the CISG applies ratione materiae, on the substantive law level the CISG is lex specialis for international sales contracts in cases in which the parties have their places of business in different states, and it thus prevails over the foreign non-unified sales law.
3.
If the PIL of the forum in a non-Contracting State designates the law of a foreign Contracting State that has made an Art. 95 reservation, the court in the nonContracting State has, here again, to apply the foreign law as it finds it, and the coordination, under the foreign law, of the CISG and the domestic non-unified sales law has to be respected and followed. If the foreign country has used the option in Art. 95, and if the law of this country applies, the CISG is then to be treated rather like an international Convention requiring reciprocity than an integral part of this country's domestic sales law. The CISG then is only applicable if both parties have their places of business in different Contracting States. 4.
For many issues, the solutions provided for in the CISG are much more familiar to parties, lawyers, and judges in Common Law countries than the solutions they will find in many foreign legal systems with civil law traditions, in particular those on the continent. Courts in the UK and Ireland and other nonContracting States consequently are not only required to apply the CISG if the Rome I Regulation designates the law of a Contracting State of the CISG; they are arguably also well advised to do so. 38 See <www.unilex.info>; <www.cisg.law.pace.edu>; <www.cisg-online.ch>.
5.
Last but not least, if judges in non-Contracting States to the CISG did apply the CISG in cases where their PIL rules refer to the law of a Contracting State of the CISG, they would apply the same set of rules as judges in Contracting States. Forum shopping would be avoided and legal certainty and the foreseeability of the outcome would be considerably enhanced in cases of international sales of goods.
